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Outrage
Cass R. Sunstein*
Outrage is a common reaction to perceived wrongdoing. Those who feel
outrage are often motivated to injure or punish wrongdoers, whether through
violence, law, or otherwise. But how are legal outcomes affected by outrage?
Inside and outside of law, how do people translate their outrage into more tangible
penalties? How does group discussion affect outrage? Are groups more outraged
than individuals or less so?
In this Article I attempt to make some progress on these questions. For a
number of years, I have been engaged in a series of experimental studies of
punitive damage awards with Daniel Kahneman, David Schleade, and Ilana
Ritov.' The goal of those studies has been to uncover some of the sources of
unpredictability in such awards and also to understand the sources of low and high
awards. The resulting work, much of it highly technical, seems to me to have
broader implications for a range of issues in both law and politics. Many public
officials and juries are charged with the task of "mapping" some factual or moral
judgment onto a numerical scale, involving dollars or years. If punishment
judgments are typically a function of outrage, the problems found injury behavior
might well have analogies in criminal sentencing and administrative fines. And
if punitive awards are erratic, for predictable reasons, might not the same be true
for awards involving libel, intentional infliction of emotional distress, sexual
harassment, and more?
In any case, outrage, in mild and less mild forms, seems to help produce
behavior in many domains. If we know something about the dynamics of outrage,
we might be able to understand behavior that is otherwise inexplicable. An
especially important issue involves the relationship between individual action and
group action. If groups moderate outrage, or increase it, then we might be able to
see what produces radicalism, extremism, and even violence and terrorism. In
investigating some of these issues, I draw throughout on our empirical findings,

*Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, Law School and
Department of Political Science, University of Chicago. This text is the basis for the Leary Lecture,
delivered at the S.J. Quinney College of Law at the University of Utah on September 10, 2002.
'See Daniel Kahneman et al., Shared Outrage and Erratic Awards: The Psychology of
PunitiveDamages, 16 J.RISK& UNCERTAINTY 49 (1998); David Schkade et al., DeliberatingAbout
Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1139 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing
Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071 (1998)
[hereinafter Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages];Cass R. Sunstein et al., Do People Want
Optimal Deterrence?, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 237 (2000) [hereinafter Sunstein et al., Optimal
Deterrence?];Cass R. Sunstein et al., PredictablyIncoherent Judgments, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1153
(2002). Many of these papers are collected in CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: How
JURIES DECIDE (2002) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES].
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but in a way that involves my own extrapolations, some of them admittedly
speculative.
The simplest lessons are that punitive awards are rooted in outrage; that
levels of outrage command a degree of agreement among diverse Americans, at
least in some domains; but that people have a great deal of difficulty in
"mapping" their outrage onto a bounded scale. Among other things, we find that
the process of group discussion dramatically changes individual views by making
people move toward higher dollar awards. In other words, groups often go to
extremes.2 The point has large implications for the role of outrage in deliberation
and the effect of deliberation in altering outrage. We also find that people's
judgments about cases, viewed one at a time, are very different from their
judgments about cases seen together. Making one-shot decisions, people produce
patterns that they themselves regard as arbitrary and senseless. The point has large
implications for the aspiration to coherence within the legal system.
More particularly, our principal findings are as follows:3
"

"

"

"

*

In making moral judgments about personal injury cases, people's judgments
are both predictable and widely shared. The judgments of one group of six
people, or twelve people, nicely predict the judgments of another group of
six people, or twelve people. These shared judgments cut across
demographic differences, so that there is no difference, in the relevant cases,
between rich and poor, old and young, white and African-American, poorly
educated and well-educated.
In making punitive damage awards about personal injury cases, people's
judgments are highly unpredictable and far from shared. People do not have
a clear sense of the meaning of different points along the dollar scale. Hence
dollar judgments of one group of six people, or twelve people, do not well
predict the dollar judgments of other groups of six people, or twelve people.
As compared with the median of predeliberation judgments, the effect of
deliberation is to increase dollar awards, often quite substantially. Group
discussions have the remarkable effect of raising group members'judgments
about appropriate punishment. And when people are outraged, group
discussion makes them more outraged still.
People care about deterrence, but they do not think in terms of optimal
deterrence. People are intuitive retributivists, and they reject some of the
most common and central understandings in economic and utilitarian theory.
People's judgments about cases in isolation are systematically different from
their judgments about cases taken together. The consequence of the system

2

The point is discussed in more detail in ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE SECOND
EDITION 200-45 (1986).
3
These findings are based on the studies cited supra note 1.
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of "one at a time" judgments is to produce a pattern of outcomes that seems
incoherent to the very people who make those judgments.
Now for some details. For purposes of the present discussion, I will speak
broadly and in qualitative terms; readers interested in numbers and statistical
analysis might consult the papers from which I shall draw.
I. STEADY NORMS, UNSTEADY AWARDS 4

Suppose that people are asked to rank a set of personal injury cases, or libel
cases, or cases involving sexual harassment or damage to the environment.
Suppose, too, that people are asked to rate those cases, in terms of appropriate
punishment, on a bounded numerical scale-say, 0 to 8, where 0 means "punished
not at all," 4 means "punished moderately," and 8 means "punished extremely
severely." Will people agree? Will the decision of one group of six, or twelve,
provide good predictions about what other groups of six or twelve will do? The
answer will depend on whether the social norms that govern moral outrage and
intended punishment are widely shared. If they are shared, we should not expect
sharp divergences in terms of both ranking and rating.
A. Remarkably Shared Judgments
Undertaking a series of studies of citizen judgments, we found that at least
in some domains, the relevant norms are indeed widely shared. In personal injury
cases, the judgment of any particular group of six is highly likely to provide a
good prediction of the judgment of any other group of six. In this sense, a "moral
judgment" jury is indeed able to serve as the conscience of the community.
Indeed, we can go further. Members of different demographic groups show
considerable agreement about how to rank and rate personal injury cases.
Thousands of people were asked to rank and rate cases. Information was elicited
about the demographic characteristics of all of those people. As a result, it is
possible, with the help of the computer, to put individuals together, so as to
assemble all-male juries, all-female juries, all-white juries, all-African-American
juries, all-poor juries, all-rich juries, all-educated juries, all-less-educated juries,
and so forth. Creating "statistical juries" in this way, we found no substantial
disagreement, in terms of rating or ranking, within any group. In personal injury
cases, people simply agree.
Subsequent work has broadened this finding, showing that people agree on
how to rank tax violations, environmental violations, and occupational safety and

'For more detailed discussion of the methods and findings presented in Parts I and 11,see the
experimental studies cited supra note 1.
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health violations. From this evidence, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that in
a wide range of domains, people will agree how to rank and rate cases. The moral
norms within a heterogeneous culture are, to that extent, widely shared, and
strikingly so. Now this does not mean that people will agree on how to rank cases
from different categories (a point to which I will return).' Nor does it mean that
small groups will always agree on how to do the ranking. But it does mean that
within each category, agreement is the rule, not the exception.
B. Remarkably ErraticDollarAwards
What about dollars? Do the broadly shared norms also produce regularity in
jury verdicts? One of our central findings is that it does not.
With respect to dollars, both individuals and jury-size groups are all over the
map. Even when moral rankings are shared-as they generally are-dollar awards
are extremely variable. A group that awards a "5" for defendant's misconduct
might give a dollar award of $500,000, or $2 million, or $10 million. A group that
awards a "7" might award $1 million, or $10 million, or $100 million. In fact,
there is so much noise in the dollar awards that differences cannot be connected
with demographic characteristics. It is not as if one group-whites, for
example-give predictably different awards from another-say, African
Americans or Hispanics. We cannot show systematic differences between young
and old, men and women, well educated and less well educated. The real problem
is that dollar awards are quite unruly from one individual to another and from one
small group to another.
What accounts for this? Why do people share moral judgments but diverge
on dollar awards? The best answer is that the effort to "map" moral judgments
onto dollars is an exercise in "scaling without a modulus." In psychology, it is
well known that serious problems will emerge when people are asked to engage
in a rating exercise on a scale that is bounded at the bottom but not at the top and
when they are not given a "modulus" by which to make sense of various points
along the scale.6 For example, when people are asked to rate the brightness of
lights, or the loudness of noises, they will not be able to agree if no modulus is
supplied and if the scale lacks an upper bound. But once a modulus is supplied,
agreement is substantially improved. Or if the scale is given an upper bound, and
if verbal descriptions accompany some of the relevant points, people will come
into accord with one another.
The upshot is that much of the observed variability with punitive damage
awards-and in all likelihood with other damage awards too-does not come
from differences in levels of outrage or social norms. It comes from variable, and
5

See infra Part IV.

6

For a discussion on problems with "mapping," see Kahneman et al., supra note 1,at 53-55,

74-75; Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages,supra note I, at 2106-07.
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inevitably somewhat arbitrary, "moduli" selected by individual jurors and judges.
If the legal system wants to reduce the problem of different treatment of the
similarly situated, it would do well to begin by appreciating this aspect of the
problem. The point applies to many legal problems, including criminal sentences,
pain and suffering awards, administrative penalties, and damages for libel, sexual
harassment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. In these areas as well,
those entrusted with the task of "mapping" lack a modulus with which to
discipline their decisions. An empirical study of pain and suffering awards finds
that at least forty percent of the variance cannot be explained by differences in
case characteristics.7 A legal system that does not give guidance for "mapping"
is bound to create similar problems in other areas. Indeed, the rise of guidelines
for criminal sentencing can be understood as responsive, at least in part, to exactly
this problem.
II. WHAT Do GROUPS Do? THE EFFECTS OF DELIBERATION

A. The Problem
The findings thus far did not involve deliberating juries. They were based on
the judgments of individuals placed by computer into small groups with
individual views being "pooled" to create a verdict. The result was to create
"statistical juries" whose verdict consisted of the view of the median juror, which
seemed to provide a reasonable estimate of what the jury itself would do. But how
does group deliberation affect outrage? In a subsequent study, involving several
thousand people, we found that the median juror is not, in fact, a good predictor
of the ultimate verdict of the jury. What we found does not falsify the findings
just described; in a way, it reinforces them. But it also says a great deal about the
effects of deliberation on moral outrage.
The study tested the effects of deliberation on both punitive intentions and
dollar judgments. The study involved about three thousand jury-eligible citizens;
its major purpose was to determine how individuals would be influenced by
seeing and discussing the punitive intentions of others.8 To test the effects of
deliberation on punitive intentions, people were asked to record their individual
judgments privately, on a bounded scale, and then to join six-member groups to
generate unanimous "punishment verdicts." Hence, subjects were asked to record,
in advance of deliberation, a "punishment judgment" on a scale of 0 to 8, where
0 indicated that the defendant should not be punished at all and 8 indicated that
the defendant should be punished extremely severely. After the individual
judgments were recorded, jurors were asked to deliberate to a unanimous
7

David Leebron, FinalMoments: Damagesfor PainandSuffering Priorto Death, 64 N.Y.U.

L. REV. 256, 310 (1989).
8

The study is described in detail in Schkade et al., supra note 1.
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"punishment verdict." It would be reasonable to predict that the verdicts ofjuries
would be the median of punishmentjudgments ofjurors; but the prediction would
be badly wrong.
B. Findings
Two findings are especially important. First, deliberation made the lower
punishment ratings decrease when compared to the median of predeliberation
judgments of individual jurors, while deliberation made the higher punishment
ratings increase when compared to that same median. When the individual jurors
favored little punishment, the group showed a "leniency shift," meaning a rating
that was systematically lower than the median predeliberation rating of individual
members.9 But when individual jurors favored strong punishment, the group as
a whole produced a "severity shift," meaning a rating that was systematically
higher than the median predeliberation rating of individual members.'
When the median juror judgment was 4 or more on the 8-point scale, the
jury's verdict was above the median predeliberation judgment of individuals."
Consider, for example, a case involving a man who nearly drowned on a yacht
that was defectively constructed. 2 People tended to be outraged by the idea of a
defectively built yacht, and groups became far more outraged than their median
members.' 3 But when the median juror judgment was less than 4, the jury's
verdict was below the median judgment of individuals. 14 Consider a case
involving a shopper who was injured in a fall when an escalator stopped
suddenly.' 5 Individual jurors were not greatly bothered by the incident, seeing it
as a genuine accident rather than a case of serious wrongdoing; and groups were
more lenient than individuals. 6
The second important finding is that dollar awards of groups were
systematically higher than the median of individual group members-so much so
that in twenty-seven percent of the cases the dollar verdict was as high as, or
higher than, that of the highest individual judgment, predeliberation. 7 The basic
result is that deliberation causes awards to increase, and it causes high awards to
increase a great deal. The effect of deliberation, in increasing dollar awards, was
most pronounced in the case of high awards. For example, the median individual
judgment in the case involving the defective yacht was $450,000, whereas the
9

1d. at 1152,1154-56.

'o1d.
"Id
2
1d. at 1151-52.
131d
141d
151d

'61d.
7

Id. at 1140,1163.
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median jury judgment in that same case was $1 million. 8 But awards shifted
upwards for low awards as well.' 9 Consider three examples of extreme severity
shift from the raw data:

"
"

A jury whose predeliberation judgments were $200,000, $300,000, $2
million, $10 million, $10 million, and $10 million reached a verdict of $15
million;
A jury whose predeliberation judgments were $200,000, $500,000, $2
million, $5 million, and $10 million reached a verdict of $50 million;
A jury whose predeliberation judgments were $2 million, $2 million, $2.5
million, $50 million, and $100 million reached a verdict of $100 million.20

Notably, the degree of dispersion between individual predeliberation
judgments did not contribute to greater or lesser shifts as a result of deliberation.
In other words, juries whose members were in rough agreement (i.e., had a low
standard deviation) about dollars or punishment did not show a different shift
from groups whose members were in substantial disagreement about dollars or
punishment.
How can this pattern be explained? What is the relationship between outrage
and processes of group interaction?
C. Group Polarization
With respect to punishment ratings, the answer lies in the phenomenon of
group polarization. This is the pervasive process by which group members end up
in a more extreme position in line with the predeliberation tendencies of group
members. It is now well-known that if a group has a defined median position-if,
for example, people in the group tend to think that global warming is a serious
problem or that gun control is bad idea-members will shift toward a more
extreme version of what they already think.2' Consider some examples of the
basic phenomenon, which has been found in over a dozen nations: 22 (a) a group
Ild. at 1152.

t91d "

20

1d. at 1155.

"1For general discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to
Extremes,
110 YALE L.J. 71 (2000).
2
2See BROWN, supra note 2, at 222. These nations include the United States, Canada, New
Zealand, Germany, and France. See, e.g., Dominic Abrams et al., Knowing What to Think By
Knowing Who You Are: Self-categorizationand the Nature of Norm Formation, Conformity and
GroupPolarization,29 BRIT. J.SOc. PSYCHOL. 97, 112-17 (1990) (New Zealand); Johannes Zuber
et al., Choice Shift and Group Polarization:An Analysis of the Status of Argument and Social
Decision Schemes, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 50, 58-60 (1992) (Germany). Of course,

it is possible that some cultures would show a greater or lesser tendency toward polarization; this
would be an extremely interesting area for empirical study.
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of moderately profeminist women will become more strongly profeminist after
discussion; 23 (b) after discussion, citizens of France become more critical of the
United States and its intentions with respect to economic aid;24 (c) after
discussion, whites predisposed to show racial prejudice offer more negative
responses to the question whether white racism is responsible for conditions faced
by African Americans in American cities; 25 (d) after discussion, whites
predisposed not to show racial prejudice offer more positive responses to the same
question. 6 As statistical regularities, it should follow, for example, that those
moderately critical of an ongoing war effort will, after discussion, sharply oppose
the war; that those who believe that global warming is a serious problem are
likely, after discussion, to hold that belief with considerable confidence; that
people tending to believe in the inferiority of a certain racial group will become
more entrenched in this belief as a result of discussion.
In my view, there are large lessons here about the formation of outrage and
attitudes generally, and, in particular, about the role of groups in forming the
norms and views of group members. A homogeneous group might well lead
members in quite extreme directions. After speaking with one another, likeminded people are apt to end up thinking what they thought before, but much
more so. A heterogeneous group is far less likely to have this effect.
What explains group polarization? Why does deliberation drive low
punishment ratings down and move high punishment ratings up? There appear to
be three answers.2 The first involves the exchange of information within the
group. In a group that favors a high punishment rating, group members will make
many arguments in that direction and relatively few the other way. Speaking
purely descriptively, the group's "argument pool" will be skewed in the direction
of severity. Group members, listening to the various arguments, will naturally
move in that direction. As with punishment ratings, so too with much else:
feminism, global warming, capital punishment, affirmative action, and so forth.
The initial dispositions of group members will determine the proportion of
arguments in the various directions. And individuals will respond, quite rationally,
to what they have heard, thus moving in the direction suggested by the dominant
tendency.
The second explanation involves social influences. Most people want to be
a certain way and also to be perceived in a certain way. If you are in a group that
is outraged and wants to punish someone severely, you might find it

23

David G. Myers, Discussion-inducedAttitude Polarization, 28 HuM. REL. 699, 707-13
(1975).24
BROWN, supra note 2, at 223-24.
25

David G. Myers & George D. Bishop, DiscussionEffects on RacialAttitudes, 169 SCd. (n.s.)
778, 778-79
(1970).
26
1d.
27
For further discussion of the first two explanations, see BROWN, supra note 2, at 230-39.
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uncomfortable to be urging relative leniency. To protect your reputation, and
perhaps your self-conception, you might move, if you move at all, in the mostfavored direction. To be sure, some hardy souls will not move at all, and those
who are self-identified contrarians might deliberately move in the opposite
direction, rejecting the dominant view just because it is the dominant view. But
what we observed, and what is universally observed, is that most of those who
move tend to go in the group's preferred direction-and that as a result, the group
will be more extreme than its members before deliberation began. With respect
to outrage, the lesson is clear. To preserve their preferred self-image, individuals,
finding themselves in an outraged group, will tend to become more outraged still.
There is a clue here about the wellsprings of "runaway juries," crowd-control
problems, unjustified extremism, and even terrorism (as we shall soon see).28
The third explanation begins by noting that people with extreme views tend
to have more confidence that they are right and that as people gain confidence,
they become more extreme in their beliefs.2 9 The intuition here is simple: Those
who lack confidence, and who are unsure what they should think, tend to
moderate their views. It is for this reason that cautious people, not knowing what
to do, are likely to choose the midpoint between relevant extremes. 30 But if other
people seem to share one's view, that person is likely to become more confident
that that view is right-and hence to move in a more extreme direction. In a wide
variety of experimental contexts, people's opinions have been shown to become
more extreme simply because their view has been corroborated and because they
have been more confident about learning of the shared views of others.3' If a
person is unsure whether he should be outraged, he might become far more
outraged when he learns that others are outraged too. The agreement increases
confidence and hence extremity.
D. Skewed Debates
In the context of punitive damage awards by juries, a particular finding
deserves emphasis. Thus far, the discussion of the relevant study has stressed how
deliberation affected punitive intentions, measured on a bounded numerical scale.
But jurors were also asked to record their dollar judgment, in advance of
deliberation, and then to deliberate to reach dollar verdicts. As I have noted, the
highest awards increased by the largest amount-but all awards increased.32 This

28

See infra Part I. F.
See Robert S. Baron et at., Social Corroboration and Opinion Extremity, 32 J.

29

EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 537, 558 (1996).
3

See Mark Kelman et al., Context-Dependencein Legal DecisionMaking, 25 J. LEGAL STUD.
(1996).
287, 287-88
3
'Baron et al., supra note 29, at 558.
See supra text accompanying notes 17-20.

32
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might seem to be a surprise. An understanding of group polarization might
suggest that low awards would drop and high awards would be raised, with the
difference pivoting around some neutral point, say, $60,000. But this is not what
was observed.
Why did dollar awards systematically increase? A possible explanation,
consistent with group polarization, is that any positive median award suggests a
predeliberation tendency to punish, and deliberation aggravates that tendency by
increasing awards. But even if correct, this explanation seems insufficiently
specific. The striking fact is that those arguing for higher awards seem to have an
automatic "rhetorical advantage" over those arguing for lower awards. A
subsequent study of University of Chicago law students confirmed this finding,
suggesting that given prevailing social norms, people find it much easier to defend
high awards than the opposite.33 Similar findings have been made in seemingly
distant areas. Suppose that doctors are deciding what steps to take to resuscitate
patients; are individuals more or less likely to support heroic efforts? Evidence
suggests that as individuals, doctors are less likely to do so than groups, probably
because those who favor such efforts have a rhetorical advantage over those who
do not.34
Or consider the difference between individual behavior and team behavior
in the Dictator Game.35 In this game, subjects are told they can allocate a sum of
money, say $10, between themselves and some stranger. Contrary to the standard
prediction, most subjects do not keep all or almost all of the money for
themselves, choosing instead to keep somewhere between $6 and $8.36 How is
individual behavior affected once people are placed in teams? The answer is that
they choose still more equal divisions. 37 This result can be explained by reference
to a rhetorical advantage, disfavoring the suggestion of selfishness, even within
the group.38 Within the relevant population, and many imaginable other groups,
people do not want to appear to be greedy. Of course the outcome, and the effect
of group influence, would change if the dictator team had some reason for
hostility to the beneficiaries of their largesse. We can easily imagine a variation
of the Dictator Game in which, for example, people of one group were deciding
how much to allocate to another group that was thought to be far wealthier. In this
variation, the rhetorical advantage might favor greater selfishness.

33
See
34

Schkade et al., supra note 1, at 1161-62.
See Caryn Christenson & Ann Abbott, Team Medical Decision Making, in

DECISION
MAKING IN HEALTH CARE: THEORY, PSYCHOLOGY, ANi) APPLICATIONS 267, 273-76 (Gretchen

Chapman
& Frank Sonnenberg eds., 2000).
35
Timothy N. Cason & Vai-Lam Mui, A Laboratory Study of Group Polarisation in the Team
Dictator
Game, 107 ECON. J. 1465, 1465-66 (1997).
36
See id. at 1468-73.
371d.
3

xCason and Mui themselves explain the outcome in terms of social comparison, a closely
related account. See id.
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What produces a rhetorical advantage? The simplest answer points to
existing social norms, which of course vary across time and place. Among most
Americans, existing norms make it easier to argue, other things equal, for higher
penalties against corporations for egregious misconduct; but it is possible to
imagine subcommunities (corporate headquarters?) in which the rhetorical
advantage runs the other way. In extreme cases, those with a rhetorical advantage
are on the correct side of a social taboo, whether mild or strong. In any case it is
easy to imagine many other contexts in which one or another side has an
automatic rhetorical advantage. Consider, as possible examples, debates over
whether there should be higher penalties for those convicted of drug offenses, or
whether tax rates should be reduced; in modem political debates, those favoring
higher penalties and lower taxes seem to have the upper hand. Of course there are
limits on the extent of change that can be made. But when a rhetorical advantage
is involved, group deliberation will produce significant shifts in individual
judgments. Undoubtedly, legislative behavior is affected by mechanisms of this
sort, and it is likely that many movements within judicial panels can be explained
in similar terms.
Are rhetorical advantages unhelpful or damaging? In the abstract, this is an
impossible question to answer, because shifts have to be evaluated on their merits'
and in substantive terms. Perhaps the higher punitive awards that follow
deliberation are simply better; so too, perhaps, for the movements by doctors,
taking more heroic measures, and by groups deciding how equally to spread
funds. The major point is that such advantages exist; and it would be most
surprising if they were always benign. There is a minor point as well: With
respect to dollars, the severity shift produces an increase in variance and
unpredictability that is an increase over the already-high levels of unpredictability
shown by "statistical juries." This is an independent problem, one to which I will
return.
E. Some Extensions
When we consider the ingredients of punishment judgments, group
polarization and rhetorical advantage have large implications for behavior inside
and outside the courtroom. Apparently, people who begin with a high level of
outrage become still more outraged as a result of group discussion. Moreover, the
degree of the shift depends on the antecedent level of outrage; the higher the39
antecedent outrage, the greater the shift as a result of internal deliberations.

39

See Schkade et al., supra note 1,at 1152 (showing that in top five outrage cases, mean shift

was 11%, higher than in any other class of cases). The effect is more dramatic still for dollars; high
dollar awards shifted upwards by a significant margin. See id. This finding is closely connected to

another one: Extremists are most likely to shift, and likely to shift most, as a result of discussions
with one another. See

JOHN TURNER ET AL., REDISCOVERING THE SOCIAL GROUP: A SELF-
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There is a point here about the sources not only of severe punishment, but also of
crowd behavior, vengeance, rebellion, and even violence, for outrage lies behind
these as well.4" If like-minded people-those predisposed to be outraged-are put
together, significant changes are to be expected. Moving well beyond the domain
of punitive damages, I offer some speculative remarks on possible extensions
here.
It should be easy to see that group polarization is inevitably at work in feuds,
ethnic and international strife, and war. One of the characteristic features of feuds
is that members of feuding groups tend to talk only to one another, fueling and
amplifying their outrage, and solidifying their impression of the relevant events.
Group polarization occurs every day within Israel and among the Palestinian
Authority. Many social movements become possible through the heightened
effects of outrage on group members;4 consider the movement for rights for deaf
people, which was greatly enhanced by the fact that the deaf have a degree of
geographical isolation. 42 And group polarization is not a social constant. It can be
increased or decreased, and even eliminated, by certain features of group
members or their situation. Consider three factors in particular.
1. Antecedent Extremism
Extremists are especially prone to polarization. It is more probable that they
will shift, and it is probable that they will shift more. When they start out at an
extreme point, and are placed in a group of like-minded people, they are likely to
go especially far in the direction with which they started.43 As I have suggested,
there is a lesson here about the sources of terrorism and political violence in
general, a lesson to which I shall return.44 And because there is a link between
confidence and extremism, the confidence of particular members also plays an
important role; confident people are all the more prone to polarization.45

CATEGORIZATION THEORY 154-59 (1987).

4'See Russell Hardin, The Crippled Epistemology of Extremism, in

POLITICAL EXTREMISM

AND RATIONALITY
3, 16 (Albert Breton et al. eds., 2002).
41

Pun.

See Edna Ullmann-Margalit & Cass R. Sunstein, Inequality and Indignation, 30 PHIL. &
337, 360 (2001).

AFF.
42

See Sharon Groch, Free Spaces: Creating Oppositional Consciousness in the Disability
Rights Movement, in OPPOSITIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS 65, 67-72 (Jane Mansbridge & Aldon Morris

eds., 2001).
43
This is a finding in the study of punitive damage awards, where groups with extreme
medians showed the largest shifts. See Schkade et al., supra note 1,at 1152. For other evidence, see
TURNER ET AL., supra note 39, at 158.
"See
Hardin, supra note 40, at 16-19; infra Part II.F.
45
See Maryla Zaleska, The Stability of Extreme and Moderate Responses in Different
Situations, in GROUP DECISION MAKING 163, 163-64 (Hermann Brandstitter et al. eds., 1982).
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2. Solidarity andAffective Ties
If members of the group think that they have a shared identity and a high
degree of solidarity, there will be heightened polarization.46 One reason is that if
people feel united by some factor (for example, politics or necessity), dissent will
be dampened. Hence if members of the deliberating group are connected by
affective ties, polarization will increase.47 If they tend to perceive one another as
friendly, likeable, and similar to them, the size and likelihood of the shift will
increase.48 The existence of such ties reduces the number of divergent arguments
and also intensifies social influences on choice. One implication is that mistakes
are likely to be increased when group members are united mostly through
affective ties and not through concentration on a particular task; it is in the former
case that alternative views will less likely find expression.49 It follows that people
are less likely to shift if the direction advocated is being pushed by unfriendly
group members; the likelihood of a shift, and its likely size, are increased when
people perceive fellow members as friendly, likeable, and similar to them.5" A
sense of "group belongingness" affects the extent of polarization.5 l In the same
vein, physical spacing tends to reduce polarization; a sense of common fate and
intragroup similarity tend to increase it, as does the introduction of a rival
"outgroup.' 52
An interesting experiment attempted to investigate the effects of group
identification by manipulating two variables. 3 First, some subjects were given
instructions in which group membership was made salient (the "group immersion"
condition), whereas others were not (the "individual" condition). For example,
subjects in the group immersion condition were told that their group consisted
solely of first-year psychology students and that they were being tested as group
members rather than as individuals. Second, some subjects were "deindividualized" by having to work on computers in separate rooms, whereas
others were asked to work in a single office with desks facing each other (the

et al., supra note 22, at 112-16.
"Abrams
47
See Brooke Harrington, The Pervasive Effects of Network Content 2 (2000) (unpublished
on file with Utah Law Review).
manuscript,
48
See Hermann Brandst~itter, Social Emotions in Discussion Groups, in DYNAMICS OF GROUP
DECISIONS 93, 107-08 (Hermann Brandstitter et al. eds., 1978); see also TURNER ET AL., supranote
39, at 154-59 (attempting to use this evidence as basis for new synthesis, labeled "a selfcategorization theory of group polarization").
49See Harrington, supra note 47, at 220-26.
5°See Brandstatter, supra note 48, at 107-08; see also TURNER ET AL., supra note 39, at 158
(implying that group of comparative extremists will show comparatively greater shift toward
extremism).
ET AL., supra note 39, at 151.
51TURNER
52
1d.

53Russell Spears, De-Individualization and Group Polarization in Computer-Mediated

Communication, 29 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 121, 123-24 (1990).
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"individualized" condition). In the de-individualized condition, visual anonymity
was increased. All conditions were held constant in one respect: Every subject
was told that people "like them" tended to support one or another view. The
relevant issues involved affirmative action, government subsidies for the theatre,
privatization of nationalized industries, and phasing out nuclear power plants.
The results were quite striking. Polarization generally occurred. But there
was the least such polarization in the individual/individuated condition; group
polarization was greatest in the de-individuated/group immersion condition, when
group members met relatively anonymously and when group identity was
emphasized. Interestingly, there was no significant difference in polarization
between the two individuated conditions (with and without emphasis on group
immersion). 4 From this experiment, it is reasonable to speculate that polarization
is highly likely to occur, and to be most extreme; when group membership is
made salient.
3. Exit
Over time, group polarization can be fortified through "exit," as members
leave the group because they reject the direction in which things are heading." If
exit is pervasive, the tendency to extremism will be greatly aggravated. The point
bears on the beliefs and actions of some religious groups, cults, dissident groups,
and political outsiders of multiple sorts. As ambivalent members leave, the
median group member becomes more extreme (and outraged), and interactions
breed more extremity still. At the same time, a number of exits might well breed
stronger intergroup norms of solidarity, thus stifling dissent. Political extremism
and violence are a-predictable result.56
F. A BriefSpeculative Note on Outrage and Terrorism
I have referred in several places to the relationship among outrage, group
polarization, and terrorism. It will be useful to offer some notes on this topic,
partly because it is of independent interest and partly because the processes
involved in terrorism can find analogues in far more benign processes.57 When
groups become caught up in hatred and violence, it is rarely because of economic

' 41d. at 130.
55See Hardin, supra note 40, at 9.
56See id
"In this section I draw on substantially similar material that appears in Cass R. Sunstein, Why
They Hate Us: The Role ofSocial Dynamics, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 429, 435-39 (2002).
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deprivation58 or primordial suspicions;" it is far more often a product of social
mechanisms.6" Indeed, unjustified extremism frequently results from a "crippled
epistemology," in which extremists react to a small subset of relevant information,
coming mostly from one another.6
A central point is that terrorist leaders act as polarization entrepreneurs. They
create enclaves of like-minded people. They stifle dissenting views and do not
tolerate internal disagreement. They take steps to ensure a high degree of internal
solidarity. They restrict the relevant argument pool and take full advantage of
reputational forces, above all by using the incentive of group approval. Terrorist
acts themselves are motivated .by these forces and incentives. Consider, for
example, the following account:
Terrorists do not even consider that they may be wrong and that others'
views may have some merit .... They attribute only evil motives to
anyone outside their own group. [The] common characteristic of the
psychologically motivated terrorist is the pronounced need to belong to
a group . . . . Such individuals define their social status by group
acceptance.
Terrorist groups with strong internal motivations find it necessary
to justify the group's existence continuously. A terrorist group must
terrorize. As [sic] a minimum, it must commit violent acts to maintain
group self-esteem and legitimacy. Thus, terrorists sometimes carry out
attacks that are objectively nonproductive or even counterproductive to
their announced goal.62
In fact, terrorist organizations impose psychological pressures to accelerate
the movement in extreme directions. Here, too, group membership plays a key
role. Thus:
Another result of psychological motivation is the intensity of group
dynamics among terrorists. They tend to demand unanimity and be
intolerant of dissent. With the enemy clearly identified and
unequivocally evil, pressure to escalate the frequency and intensity of
operations is ever present. The need to belong to the group discourages
resignations, and the fear of compromise disallows their acceptance.
' 8See Alan B. Krueger & Jitka Maleckova, Education, Poverty, Political Violence and
Terrorism:
Is There a Causal Connection? 29 (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
59
See Timur Kuran, EthnicNorms andTheir TransformationThrough ReputationalCascades,
27 J. LEGAL STUD. 623, 648 (1998).
'See
Sunstein, supra note 57, at 429-35.
61
See Hardin, supra note 40, at 18-20.
62
TERRORISM RESEARCH CENTER, THE BASICS OF TERRORISM Part 2: The Terrorists, available
at http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/2468/basics.html (n.d.).
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Compromise is rejected, and terrorist groups lean toward maximalist
positions.... In societies in which people identify themselves in terms
of group membership (family, clan, tribe), there may be a willingness
to self-sacrifice seldom seen elsewhere.6 3
Training routines specifically reinforce the basic message of solidarity amidst
outrage and humiliation. Hitler similarly attempted to create group membership,
and to fuel movements toward extremes, by stressing the suffering and the
humiliation of the German people. This is a characteristic strategy of terrorists of
all stripes, for humiliation fuels outrage. 64 "Many al-Qaida trainees saw videos...
daily as part of their training routine. Showing hundreds of hours of Muslims in
dire straits-Palestinians ... Bosnians ... Chechens ... Iraqi children-was all
part of al-Qaida's induction strategy. 65 In the particular context of Al Qaeda,
there is a pervasive effort to link Muslims all over the globe, above all by
emphasizing a shared identity, one that includes some and excludes others. Thus
Osama bin Laden "appeals to a pervasive sense of humiliation and powerlessness
in Islamic countries. Muslims are victims the world over ... Bosnia, Somalia,
Palestine, Chechnya, and... Saudi Arabia.... [H]e makes the world simple for
people who are otherwise confused, and gives them a sense of mission., 66 Hence
there are unmistakable cult-like features to the indoctrination effort: "[T]he
military training [in Al Qaeda camps] is accompanied by forceful religious
indoctrination, with recruits being fed a stream of anti-western propaganda and
' 67
being incessantly reminded about their duty to perform jihad.
Intense connections are built into the structure: "The structure of Al Qaida,
an all-male enterprise,... appears to involve small groups of relatively young
men who maintain strong bonds with each other, bonds whose intensity is
dramatised and heightened
by the secrecy demanded by their missions and the
68
danger of their projects.
This discussion, brief and speculative as it is, should be sufficient to show
the central role of outrage and group dynamics in producing terrorists, and indeed
in answering the much-disputed question, "Why do they hate us?" Terrorists are
made, not born. More particularly, terrorists are made through emphatically social
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'On humiliation, see AVISHAI

MARGALIT, THE DECENT SOCIETY

9-27 (Naomi Goldblum

trans., 1996).

"Giles Foden, Secrets of a TerrorMerchant, MELBOURNE AGE, Sept. 14, 2001,
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66Jeffrey
Bartholet, Method to the Madness, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 22, 2001, at 55.
67
Stephen Grey & Dipesh Gadher, Inside Bin Laden's Academies of Terror, THE SUNDAY
TIMES 68(LONDON), Oct. 7, 2001, at 10.
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processes. Things could easily be otherwise. Timur Kuran has shown that
"ethnification"--close identification with one's ethnic group, in a way that
involves hatred of others-is not a matter of history but of current social
processes, closely akin to those discussed here.69 With relatively small changes,
a nation that suffers from intense ethnic antagonism could be free from that
scourge. So too, I am suggesting, for terrorism. If enclaves of like-minded and
susceptible people are an indispensable breeding ground for terrorism, then it is
easy to imagine a situation in which nations, not radically different from the way
they are today, could be mostly free from terrorist threats.
The simplest and most important lesson for law and policy is that if a nation
aims to prevent terrorist activities, a good strategy is to prevent the rise of
enclaves of like-minded people. Many of those who become involved in terrorist
activities could end up doing something else with their lives. Their interest in
terrorism comes, in manycases, from an identifiable set of social mechanisms
(generally from associating with extremist leaders and like-minded others). If the
relevant associations can be disrupted, terrorism is far less likely to arise.
III. RETRIBUTION AND DETERRENCE
Now let us return to the question of punishment. On the economic account,
the state's goal when imposing penalties is to ensure optimal deterrence. To
increase deterrence, the law might increase the severity of punishment or instead
increase the likelihood of punishment. A government that lacks substantial
enforcement resources might impose high penalties, thinking that it will produce
the right deterrent "signal" in light of the fact that many people will escape
punishment altogether. A government that has sufficient resources might impose
a lower penalty but enforce the law against all or almost all violators.
In the context of punitive damages, all this leads to a simple theory: The
purpose of such damages is to make up for the shortfall in enforcement. If injured
people are 100% likely to receive compensation, there is no need for punitive
damages. If injured people are 50% likely to receive compensation, those who
bring suit should receive a punitive award that is twice the amount of the
compensatory award. The simple exercise in multiplication will ensure optimal
deterrence.
But there is a large question whether social norms and the theory of optimal
deterrence can fit together. Do people want optimal deterrence? Do they accept
or reject the economic theory of punishment?
We attempted to cast light on this question through two experiments.7" In the
first, we gave people cases of wrongdoing, arguably calling for punitive damages,
69

See Kuran, supra note 59, at 648-49.
The two experiments are discussed in Sunstein et al., Optimal Deterrence?,supra note 1,
and SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES, supra note I, at 132-41.
70
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and also provided people with explicit information about the probability of
detection. Different people saw the same case, with only one difference: varying
probability of detection. People were asked about the amount ofpunitive damages
that they would choose to award. Our goal was to see if people would impose
higher punishments when the probability of detection was low.
In the second experiment, we asked people to evaluate judicial and executive
decisions to reduce penalties when the probability of detection was high and to
increase penalties when the probability of detection was low. We wanted people
to say whether they approved or disapproved of varying the penalty with the
probability of detection.
Our findings were simple and straightforward. The first experiment found
that varying the probability of detection had no effect on punitive awards. Even
when people's attention was explicitly directed to the probability of detection,
people were indifferent to it. People's decisions about appropriate punishment
were unaffected by seeing a high or low probability of detection. Outrage is what
matters, not the probability of detection. The second experiment found that strong
majorities of respondents rejected judicial decisions to reduce penalties because
of high probability of detection-and also rejected executive decisions to increase
penalties because of low probability of detection. In other words, people did not
approve of an approach to punishment that would make the level of punishment
vary with the probability of detection. What apparently concerned them was the
extent of the wrongdoing, and the right degree of moral outrage-not optimal
deterrence.
The most general conclusion is that social norms do not coexist comfortably
with optimal deterrence theory. People seem to be intuitive retributivists. They
come to the social role of juror with moral intuitions inconsistent with the
economic theory of deterrence. Those intuitions are grounded in outrage. Facts of
the case that dampen or weaken outrage will have an effect on punitive intentions.
And those intentions will interact in complex ways with dollar awards, precisely
because of the difficulty of translating moral outrage into a number that can be
used by the legal system.
IV. COHERENCE, CATEGORIES, AND CONTEXT

I have suggested that people have a fairly easy time rating and ranking cases
within a single category. Hence they share judgments about the outrageousness
of a defendant's conduct in a personal injury case. But do people sharejudgments
about how to compare a personal injury case with a libel case? Can people
compare cases across categories? Probably most important: What would they
think of the pattern that they produce if, as is usual, they tend to decide cases one
at a time? The question seems quite important, because it bears on the question
whether the legal system can produce coherent patterns in which distinctions,
between plaintiffs and defendants alike, make a degree of sense.
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We do not have full answers to these questions, but suggestive evidence has
started to emerge. The simplest point is that when people are trying to rank cases
from different categories, they have far more difficulty, in the sense that they are
unsure exactly what to do. This lack of certainty translates into a lack of
consensus. People agree much more on how to rank cases within a category than
how to rank cases across categories. (I put to one side the evident difficulties in
deciding what counts as a "category.") It is easy to design experiments in which
people will simply disagree about whether (for example) a comparatively serious
tax violation is worse, or not as bad, than a lawless act that harms the
environment. Hence the social norms that govern cross-category comparisons are
not as widely shared as the social norms that govern within-category comparisons.
Perhaps this is not big news. A more striking finding is that people's
judgments about cases, taken one at a time, are very different from their
judgments about the same cases, taken in the context of a problem from another
category. An example: People were asked to assess a case involving a personal
injury on a bounded scale and also on a dollar scale. People were also asked to
assess a case involving financial injury on a bounded scale and also on a dollar
scale. When the two cases were judged in isolation, the financial injury case
received a more severe rating and a higher dollar award. But when the two cases
were seen together, there was a significant judgment shift in which people tried
to ensure that the financial award was not higher than the personal injury award.
People's decisions about the two cases were very different, depending on whether
they saw a case alone or in the context of a case from another category.
Exactly the same kind of shift was observed for judgments about two
problems calling for government regulation and expenditures: skin cancer among
the elderly and protection of coral reefs. Looking at the two cases in isolation,
people wanted to pay more to protect coral reefs and registered more satisfaction
from doing that. But looking at the two cases together, people were quite
disturbed at this pattern and generally wanted to pay more to protect elderly
people from skin cancer. Here too there was a significant shift in judgment.
Is this a problem? And what accounts for the switch? Let me offer a
preliminary account. When people see a case in isolation, they naturally
"normalize" it by comparing it to a set of comparison cases that it readily calls up.
If you are asked, is a German shepherd big or small, you are likely to respond that
it is big; if you are asked, is a Volkswagen Beetle big or small, you are likely to
respond that it is small. But people are well aware that a German shepherd is
smaller that a Volkswagen Beetle. People answer as they do because a German
shepherd is compared with dogs, whereas a Volkswagon Beetle is compared with
cars. So far, so good; in these cases, everyone knows what everyone else means.
We easily normalize judgments about size, and the normalization is mutually
understood. (John Stockton, who is about six feet tall, is a very small basketball
player.) What happens, in ordinary communication, is innocuous. It does not
breed error or confusion.

HeinOnline -- 2002 Utah L. Rev. 735 2002

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[2002: 717

In the context of legally relevant moral judgments, something similar
happens, but it is far from innocuous. When evaluating a case involving financial
injury, people apparently "normalize" the defendant's conduct by comparing it
with conduct in other cases from the same category. They do not easily or
naturally compare that defendant's conduct with conduct from other categories.
Because of the natural comparison set, people are likely to be quite outraged by
the misconduct, if it is far worse than what springs naturally to mind. The same
kind of thing happens with the problem of skin cancer among the elderly. People
compare that problem with other similar problems-and conclude that it is not so
serious, within the category of health-related or cancer-related problems. So too
with personal injury cases (normalized against other personal injury cases) and
problems involving damage to coral reefs (normalized against other cases of
ecological harm).
When a case from another category is introduced, this natural process of
comparison is disrupted. Rather than comparing a skin cancer case with other
cancers, or other human health risks, people see that it must be compared with
ecological problems, which (in most people's view) have a lesser claim to public
resources. Rather than comparing a financial injury case to other cases of business
misconduct, people now compare it to a personal injury case, which (in most
people's view) involves more serious wrongdoing. As a result of the wider
viewscreen, judgments shift, often dramatically.
I believe that this uncovers a serious problem with current practice in many
domains of law. The problem is that when people assess cases in isolation, their
viewscreen is narrow, indeed limited to the category to which the case belongs,
and that as a result, people produce a pattern of outcomes that makes no sense by
their own light. In other words, the overall set of outcomes is one that people
would not endorse, if they were only to see it as a whole. Their considered
judgments reflect the very pattern that they have produced, because of a
predictable feature of human cognition. The result is a form of incoherence. We
can find that incoherence not only injury verdicts, but also in administrative fines
and in criminal sentencing, where no serious effort has been made to ensure that
the overall pattern of outcomes makes the slightest sense. Indeed there is reason
to believe that the pattern, in many domains, is quite senseless. And it may not be
too much of a stretch to suggest that the same is true of reactions, some of the
time, by both individuals and institutions-that people are quite outraged about
behavior that, in a broader or different comparison set, would outrage them little
or not at all.
V. CONCLUSION

In this Article I have attempted to cast some light on the relationship among
outrage, punitive intuitions, group deliberation, coherence, and several other
issues in law and legal theory. We have seen that diverse people rank and rate
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cases, within a single category, in a similar way; that they produce erratic dollar
awards largely because of the difficulty of using a dollar scale; and that with
respect to moral judgments, discussion moves people toward a more extreme
point in light of their initial predisposition. We have also seen that with respect
to dollars, discussion increases awards; that existing norms fit poorly with optimal
deterrence theory; and that one-shot judgments produce patterns that people
would reject, if only they were to see them. I have also offered some extensions
and speculations. Perhaps most importantly, I have suggested that outrage is
highly vulnerable to group influences and that a set of like-minded people is
highly likely to go to extremes. The point helps to explain behavior within
ordinary legislatures as well as behavior by political extremists of all kind.
These are descriptive points. It is far from clear what, if anything, should be
done by way of legal reform. But in the context of civil litigation, it would be
reasonable to conclude that a system of one-shot judgments by juries, scaling in
the dark and offered no comparison cases, is not likely to be a sensible way to
produce civil fines. Arbitrariness and incoherence are almost inevitable. In the
abstract, a more bureaucratic approach, allowing a degree of rationalization,
would seem to be far superior. Of course, I cannot defend such an approach in this
space; bureaucracies have notorious problems of their own, not least because they
can be out of touch with prevailing social norms. But with an understanding of the
problems discussed here, perhaps we can make better sense of some of the largest
movements in twentieth century law, which consisted precisely in an effort to
replace one-shot jury decisions with institutions that are accountable and subject
to prevailing norms, but also able to overcome serious cognitive problems faced
by isolated individuals and groups.71 On this view, the proper response to such
problems consists in better institutional design. It would not be at all surprising
if the twenty-first century saw bolder movements in the same general direction.
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compensation programs in early twentieth century America).
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